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from reason because of an excess, and these because of a deficiency, the continent
man holds fast and is not turned aside by the one or the other.
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But if continence be a good thing, the characters that are opposed to it must be bad, as
in fact they evidently are; only, since the other extreme is found but rarely and in few
cases, incontinence comes to be regarded as the only opposite of continence, just as
profligacy comes to be regarded as the only opposite of temperance.
We often apply names metaphorically; and so we come to speak metaphorically of the
continence of the temperate man. For it is the nature both of the continent and of the
temperate man never to do anything contrary to reason for the sake of bodily
pleasures; but whereas the former has, the latter has not bad desires, and whereas the
latter is of such a nature as to take no delight in what is contrary to reason, the former
is of such a nature as to take delight in, but not to be swayed by them.
The incontinent and the profligate also resemble each other, though they are different:
both pursue bodily pleasures, but the latter pursues them on principle,* while the
former does not.
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10.
Prudence Is Not, But Cleverness Is, Compatible With
Incontinence.
It is impossible for the same man to be at once prudent and incontinent; for we have
shown that a man cannot be prudent without being at the same time morally good.
Moreover, a man is not prudent simply because he knows he must also be apt to act
according to his knowledge; but the incontinent man is not apt to act according to his
knowledge (though there is nothing to prevent a man who is clever at calculating
means from being incontinent; and so people sometimes think a man prudent and yet
incontinent, because this cleverness is related to prudence in the manner before*
explained, resembling prudence as an intellectual faculty, but differing from it by the
absence of purpose): nor indeed does he know as one who knows and is now using his
knowledge, but as one may know who is asleep or drunk.
He acts voluntarily (for in a manner he knows what he is doing and with what object),
and yet is not bad: for his purpose is good; so he is only half bad. Moreover,
incontinent men are not unjust, for they are not deliberately malicious some of
them being apt to swerve from their deliberate resolutions, others of melancholic
temper and apt to act without deliberating at all. An incontinent man, then, may be
compared to a state which always makes excellent decrees and has good laws, but
never carries them out; as Anaxandrides jestingly says
 So willed the state that takes no heed of laws.
The bad man, on the contrary, may be compared to a state that carries out its laws, but
has bad laws.
Both incontinence and continence imply something beyond the average character of
men; for the one is more steadfast than most men can be, the other less.
Of the several kinds of incontinence, that of the melancholic temper is more curable
than that of those who make resolutions but do not keep them, and that which
proceeds from custom than that which rests on natural infirmity: it is easier to alter
one s habit than to change one s nature. For the very reason why habits are hard to
change is that they are a sort of second nature, as Euenus says
 Train men but long enough to what you will,
And that shall be their nature in the end.
We have now considered the nature of continence and incontinence, of hardiness and
softness, and the relation of these types of character to each other.
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CHAPTERS 11 14.
OF PLEASURE.
11.
We Must Now Discuss Pleasure. Opinions About It.
The consideration of pleasure and pain also falls within the scope of the political
philosopher, since he has to construct the end by reference to which we call
everything good or bad.
Moreover, this is one of the subjects we are bound to discuss; for we said that moral
virtue and vice have to do with pleasures and pains, and most people say that
happiness implies pleasure, which is the reason of the name ¼±º¬Á¹¿Â, blessed, from
DZ¯Áµ¹½, to rejoice.
Now, (1) some people think that no pleasure is good, either essentially or accidentally,
for they say that good and pleasure are two distinct things; (2) others think that though
some pleasures are good most are bad; (3) others, again, think that even though all
pleasures be good, yet it is impossible that the supreme good can be pleasure.
(1) It is argued that pleasure cannot be good, (a) because all pleasure is a felt
transition to a natural state, but a transition or process is always generically different
from an end, e.g. the process of building is generically different from a house; (b)
because the temperate man avoids pleasures; (c) because the prudent man pursues the
painless, not the pleasant; (d) because pleasures impede thinking, and that in
proportion to their intensity (for instance, the sexual pleasures: no one engaged
therein could think at all); (e) because there is no art of pleasure, and yet every good
thing has an art devoted to its production; (f) because pleasure is the pursuit of
children and brutes.
(2) It is argued that not all pleasures are good, because some are base and disgraceful,
and even hurtful; for some pleasant things are unhealthy.
(3) It is argued that pleasure is not the supreme good, because it is not an end, but a
process or transition. These, then, we may take to be the current opinions on the
subject.
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12.
Answers To Arguments Against Goodness Of Pleasure.
Ambiguity Of Good And Pleasant. Pleasure Not A Transition,
But Unimpeded Activity.
But that these arguments do not prove that pleasure is not good, or even the highest
good, may be shown as follows.
In the first place, since  good is used in two senses ( good in itself and  relatively
good ), natures and faculties will be called good in two senses, and so also will
motions and processes: and when they are called bad, this sometimes means that they
are bad in themselves, though for particular persons not bad but desirable; sometimes
that they are not desirable even for particular persons, but desirable occasionally and
for a little time, though in themselves not desirable; while some of them are not even
pleasures, though they seem to be I mean those that involve pain and are used
medicinally, such as those of sick people.
In the second place, since the term good may be applied both to activities and to [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]